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Abstract— We present a control architecture for non-verbal
HRI that allows an assistant robot to have a pro-active and an-
ticipatory behavior. The architecture implements the coordina-
tion of actions and goals among the human, that needs help, and
the robot as a dynamic process that integrates contextual cues,
shared task knowledge and predicted outcome of the human
motor behavior. The robot control architecture is formalized
by a coupled system of dynamic neural fields representing a
distributed network of local but connected neural populations
with specific functionalities. Different subpopulations encode
task relevant information about action means, action goals
and context in form of self-sustained activation patterns. These
patterns are triggered by input from connected populations and
evolve continuously in time under the influence of recurrent
interactions. The dynamic control architecture is validated in
an assistive task in which an anthropomorphic robot acts as
a personal assistant of a person with motor impairments.
We show that the context dependent mapping from action
observation onto appropriate complementary actions allows
the robot to cope with dynamically changing situations. This
includes adaptation to different users and mutual compensation
of physical limitations.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the current theoretical and experimental challenges
in assistive robotics is how to develop autonomous robots
able to assist people in a human-like way (reviews e.g.[13],
[5], [21], [8], [26]). Humans prefer to interact with machines
in the same way that they interact with other people[18].
This implies that in order to guarantee user acceptance, a
personal assistant robot should be endowed with social and
cognitive capacities that allow the human-robot interaction
to be natural and efficient. In assistive tasks we continuously
monitor the actions of the person with whom we interact,
interpret them in terms of their underlying motor intentions,
predict the concomitant outcome, and use these predictions to
select an adequate action that complements and coordinates
with the observed action [23], [16]. Imagine for instance
the task of assisting a person during a meal. The way how
a person grasps a certain object, e.g. a bottle of juice,
allows the observer to infer the ultimate goal of the action.
Depending on the grip type, the person may want to pour the
juice on a glass or, alternatively, has the intention to hand
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it over. Being able to predict, at the time of grasping, the
goal of the complete action allows the observer to timely
grasp and hold out the glass, or to prepare to receive the
bottle. The problem of action coordination may be solved
using verbal communication but in some situations this
kind of communication may slow down or even make the
interaction impossible. Thus, non-verbal communication is
considered essential. Reading the non-verbal cues inherent to
every behavior favors the action transparency, the interaction
robustness and bridge physical and cognitive (dis)abilities[6].
In this paper, we present results of our ongoing research
to endow autonomous robots with cognitive capacities that
will ultimately allow them to act as socially aware agents in
assistive tasks to people with disabilities. Our strategy has
been to develop an anthropomorphic robot that integrates in
its control architecture recent experimental and theoretical
findings about the neuro-cognitive mechanisms underlying
perception and action in social contexts (e.g.[28], [12], [17],
[10], for a review see [2], [23]).
It is believed that non-human primates and humans have
within their neural structure, mechanism for mirroring ob-
served actions [20], [28]. This mirror mechanism allows
the observer to match an observed goal-directed motor
act in his/her own motor repertoire, which the observer
is familiar with. The system is called the mirror neuron
system (MNS) and is thought to be the basic mechanism
for action understanding and goal inference. Experiments
taken with humans and monkeys revealed that the motor
neurons that compose this mechanism have different degrees
of specialization, and thus code different types of action
related information. Some mirror neurons fire only when
specific motor acts are observed, whereas others have a
broader spectrum of activation. The mirror neurons that
react to specific motor acts may be responsible for the
representation of the means used to perform the action, like
the type of grasp that it is used, while the mirror neurons that
are less specific may code more abstract information about
the action. It is thought that these neurons are responsible
for action goal representation (for an overview see [19]).
Moreover, the MNS is capable to represent actions within
the cortical structures even when both agents have marked
morphological differences [14]. What matters is the action
effect (i.e. the underlying specific goal) an not so much the
details of the movement trajectory that lead to this effect [15].
This result is very important because it allows us to apply the
model of goal inference based on motor resonance in joint
tasks that involve teammates with dissimilar embodiment
like humans and robots. However, internally simulating the
motor behavior of one’s partner may not directly yield a
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full understanding of the action goals. The same goal-direct
action may have a different underlying goal depending on
the context in which the action evolves. Thus, it is necessary
to integrate additional contextual cues.
In our previous work we have developed and applied a
dynamic field model of action understanding and comple-
mentary action selection that implements these ideas [4],
[3]. It consists of a distributed network of local pools of
neurons each with specific functionality. Self-stabilized ac-
tivity patterns in these populations represent potential goals,
context and potential action means to pursue the goals.
Observed object-directed motor acts (e.g., grasping) together
with contextual cues may trigger the propagation of activity
through interconnected neural populations that constitute a
learned chain of motor primitives directed towards a specific
goal (e.g., reaching-grasping-placing at a particular position).
The dynamic field model of action understanding and com-
plementary action selection was tested in a joint construction
task in which the human-robot team assembles a toy from
its component parts knowing the construction plan. In this
paper we validate the model in an assistive task scenario
where the robot pro-actively helps a person, with motor
disabilities, to drink. The focus of the results reported here
is on dynamic action coordination among the robot and the
human which have different motor limitations that have to be
mutually compensated, flexible action selection in response
to different contextual situations and different users (more
active or more passive). Considering the human point of
view, it may happen that non-verbal communication may
not be enough to understand the robot’s behavior. Thus, we
enable the robot to reason aloud ir order to explain what
is its understanding about what the human is trying to do,
to give feedback to the human about what itself intends to
do, to suggest how they can coordinate their actions and to
communicate its own physical limitations.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces
the assistive task scenario and the robot platform. Section III
gives an overview about the cognitive control architecture
and presents the basic concepts of the dynamic field frame-
work used to formalize and implement the architecture.
The results of the human-robot interactions are described
in section IV. The paper ends with a discussion of concepts
and results and a short outlook.
II. ASSISTIVE TASK SCENARIO
One of the most important and elementary tasks performed
by humans on their daily activities is eating and drinking.
Here we consider an interaction scenario where the robot
helps a human with physical limitations to drink (Fig. 1).
The interaction scenario involves only two objects, a bottle
and a glass, placed on a table and requires only a limited
number of different motor actions to be performed by the
human and the robot but is complex enough to show the
impact of intention understanding on complementary action
selection, and adaptation to different users. The table is
divided in the middle by an imaginary line that defines
the boundary between the human workspace (HWS) and
Fig. 1. The anthropomorphic robot acts as a pro-active personal assistant
of a person, with motor impairments, that wishes to drink.
the robot workspace (RWS). The objects can be placed on
the table with different arrangements and can have different
states and orientations. More precisely, the bottle can be
closed or open and the glass can be empty upright or inverted
and full or empty. Based on the objects initial states and
disposition on the table, the number and the nature of sub-
tasks that must be accomplished to achieve the final goal
of this joint action is different. Given this and based on the
physical limitations of both agents, the interaction scenario
has three main constraints: (1) it is assumed that the human
user has a motor impairment that prevents him/her to perform
the task alone; (2) the robot does not have enough dexterity
in its hand to open the bottle, so the human is the only
agent capable of removing the stopper/cup; (3) additionally
and due to the human motor impairment, the human cannot
open the bottle alone and needs the robot’s help to remove
the cup. The robot is physically unable to grasp such a small
object, this means that to open the bottle the human and
the robot are compelled to cooperate with each other. The
cooperation between the teammates is also biased by the
objects disposition on the table which may require handing
over objects to one another. Both agents must cooperate with
each other to compensate their mutual physical disabilities.
The robot was built in our lab [24]. It consists of a stationary
torus on which a 7 DOFs AMTEC arm (Schunk GmbH)
with a three finger dexterous gripper and a stereo camera
head are mounted. A speech synthesizer (Microsoft Speech
SDK 5.1) allows the robot to verbally communicate with
the user. The information about object type, position and
pose is provided by the camera vision system. The object
recognition system combines color-based segmentation with
template matching derived from earlier learning examples
[27]. The same technique is also used for the classification
of object-directed, static hand postures, such as reaching,
grasping and grip type, and communicative gestures such
as pointing or demanding an object. For the control of the
arm-hand system we applied a global planning method in
posture space that allows us to generate smooth and natural
movements by integrating optimization principles obtained
from experiments with humans [7].
778
Fig. 2. The multi-layered cognitive control architecture for joint action. It
implements a flexible context-dependent mapping between observed actions
and executed actions.
III. COGNITIVE CONTROL ARCHITECTURE
Figure 2 presents schematically the robot cognitive control
architecture which is inspired by known neuro-cognitive
mechanisms underlying perception, reasoning and action in
a social context (for details see [4], [3]).
The architecture can be seen as a network of inter-
connected pools of neurons, organized in different layers.
Each layer is responsible for coding a different type of
information and its dynamics enables the implementation
of a dynamic process of action simulation, goal inference,
action monitoring and complementary action selections[4].
The control architecture receives input information from
the vision system. The information provided by the vision
system produces activation patterns in specialized pools of
neurons within the Observation Layer (OL), where the motor
acts observed by the robot are translated into motor primi-
tives. In the Object Memory Layer (OML) specific pools of
neurons represent the objects of interest in terms their general
position within the agents’ workplaces. The Common Sub-
Goals Layer (CSGL) consists of three sub-layers and endows
the robot with an internal dynamic representation that codes
which sub-goals have already been executed (past sub-goals),
which sub-goals can currently be performed (present sub-
goals) and future sub-goals.
Once the patterns of activation on the input layers be-
come self-sustainable, they elicit an activation pattern in the
Action Simulation Layer (ASL), where the robot internally
simulates the action performed by its partner by activating
the goal directed action that corresponds to the sequence
of observed motor acts. The patterns of activation in ASL
and CSGL activate the subpopulation in the Intention Layer
(IL) representing the current intention of the teammate. The
intention along with the information provided by OML and
CSGL provide input to the Action Execution Layer (AEL),
which through competition selects the most appropriate com-
plementary robot’s behavior. The Action Monitoring Layer
provides also input to AEL and it is also a key factor in the
process of selecting the most proper complementary action.
This layer represents mismatches between the inferred inten-
tion of the human partner and the subgoals that are currently
possible[4].
A. The Dynamic Neural Field framework
Each layer is implemented using the theoretical framework
of the Dynamic Field Theory [25], [9], [22]. In each layer
(i= ASL,AEL, ...,), the activity ui(x, t) at time t of a neuron
at field location x is described by the following integro-
differential equation ([1]):
τi
δui(x, t)
δ t
= −ui(x, t)+Si(x, t)
+
∫
wi(x− x′) fi(ui(x′, t))dx′+hi (1)
This equation is the mathematical model for a one-
dimensional field of lateral-inhibition type. The neural fields
of lateral-inhibition type are homogeneous fields that include
both excitatory and inhibitory neurons. Within these fields,
the temporal dynamics of individual neurons is neglected
over the overall behavior of the entire population. Parameters
τi and hi < 0 define the time scale and the resting level of
the dynamic field, respectively, and Si(x, t) represents the
external input applied to the field at location x and time t.
ui(x, t) represents the activity of a neuron coding the field lo-
cation x. The integral term implements the convolution of the
function containing the weights of the internal connections
between neurons and the non-linear output function f (u),
that only allows neurons that are active above a threshold
to contribute to that same internal interactions. Since the
field is of lateral-inhibition type, by convention the exci-
tatory connections dominate at proximal distances and the
inhibitory connections dominate at greater distances [1]. This
means that the excitatory or inhibitory interaction between
two neurons coding field location x and x′ respectively, only
depends on their distance, w(x−x′). The interaction behavior
of all neurons can thus be modeled by a Gaussian function
minus a constant value, winhib:
w
(
x− x′)= Ae− (x−x′)22σ2 −winhib (2)
where A > 0 and σ > 0 define, respectively, the amplitude
and standard deviation, and the constant winhib > 0 represents
the global inhibition that the active neurons carry on the rest
of the field. Only the neurons that received enough amounts
of input to become positively active are able to transmit
information to the down-stream systems and to contribute
to the internal interactions of the neural field. Additionally,
it is assumed that when the neurons pass over the activation
threshold, they all fire at their maximum rate, regardless of
the magnitude of the input pattern. To model these properties
the field dynamics must become highly non-linear, which is
achieved through the sigmoid function showed in equation
3:
f (u) =
1
1+ e−β (u−u0)
(3)
where u0 is the threshold and β > 0 is the slope parameter
[9].
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The summed input from connected fields ul is given as
Si(x, t) = k∑l Sl(x, t). The parameter k scales the total input
to a certain population relative to the threshold for triggering
a self-sustained pattern. This guarantees that the inter-field
couplings are weak compared to the the recurrent interactions
that dominate the field dynamics (for details see [9]). The
scaling also ensures that missing or delayed input from one
or more connected populations will lead to a subthreshold
activity distribution only. The input from each connected
field ul is modeled by Gaussian functions
Sl(x, t) =∑
m
∑
j
amjcl(t)exp(−(x− xm)2/2σ2) (4)
where cl(t) is a function that signals the presence or absence
of a self-stabilized activation peak in ul, and amj is the inter-
field synaptic connection between subpopulation j in ul to
subpopulation m in ui. Inputs from the vision system are
also modeled as Gaussians for simplicity.
IV. RESULTS
In the following we validate the dynamic control
architecture by presenting results of human-robot interactions
in the assistive task. The examples represent different video
snapshots that are chosen to illustrate the impact of action
observation on complementary action selection from the
perspective of the robot. The videos can be found at
http://dei-s1.dei.uminho.pt/pessoas/estela/BioRob2010.htm.
We will try to briefly illustrate how the overall system works
and how the actions performed by the human, the context
in which the action is executed and even the ’personality’
of the human can influence the robot’s decision making
process. It is important to stress that in these tests the
following assumptions are made: i) it is assumed that
the human wants to drink but he suffers from a motor
impairment that prevents him to perform the task alone; ii)
the robot has prior knowledge about the task, i.e. the robot
knows that first it is necessary to open the bottle and/or turn
the glass in upright position before filling it; iii) the robot
knows that observing a grasping of the bottle or glass from
above (above grip, AG) means that the human most likely
is going to handover the object; iv) grasping the bottle from
the side (side grip, SG) means that probably the human will
try to pour the juice in the glass; v) grasping the glass from
the side (side grip) means that the human will likely try to
invert it or to drink depending on its state. It is important to
strength that there is not a one to one mapping. In previous
work we have shown that an imitation learning paradigm
can be used to transfer the knowledge about this specific
grip-goal relation from a human teacher to the robot that
takes into account the context[11].
A. Impact of Action simulation, Goal Inference and Action
Monitoring on Action Execution
The robot is capable of acquiring the object positions
and states, and the motor primitives used by the human to
interact with the environment, through the vision system.
That information produces activation patterns on specialized
Fig. 3. An example that shows the impact of goal inference and action
monitoring on the process of complementary action selection. Panel A:
video snapshots. Panel B: Temporal evolution of the input (top) to ASL
and activity in ASL (bottom). Panel C: Temporal evolution of the input to
AEL (top) and activity in AEL (bottom).
pools of neurons in the OL, in the OML and in the CSGL.
The motor and the context information, coded by the OL,
the OML and the CSGL layers, enable the robot to simulate
the observed action at the ASL level and then obtain its
underlying intention. Thus, the decision cycle is always
composed by the action simulation and intention inference
processes. These two processes allow the robot to continu-
ously track and relate actions with their underlying context,
monitoring their outcomes. Figure 3 shows the impact of
action simulation, goal inference and action monitoring on
action execution, which may include overt motor behavior
and/or speech. The robot monitors the behavior of the human
agent, selecting the most appropriate action, taking always
into account the interaction scenario constraints and the
agents’ physical limitations.
Due to his supposed motor disability, the human is not
capable of opening the bottle on his own, so he grasps
and holds out out the bottle (Panel A, snapshot S1) as a
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request for the robot’s help. The action performed by the
human is decomposed into its motor primitives, i.e., Reach,
Grasp with SG (Side Grip), object Closed-Bottle.
This information (OL) along with the contextual information
provided by the OML and the CSGL activates de pool of
neurons coding the goal direct action-chain Reach−Grasp−
SG−Closed − Bottle in ASL layer (panel B (T0− T1)).
After that, the robot infers the intention of removing the
stopper, which is represented by an activation peak in the
IL. However, the robot is not able to grasp and rotate such
a small object and the control architecture produces an error
in the Action Monitoring Layer (AML). The pattern of field
activation within AML, coding that error, directly influences
the action selection process in the AEL. As a result of
that, the robot verbally communicates to the human its own
physical limitation (panel A, snapshots S2 and S3). As it
can be seen in panel C (T0−T1), initially there are some
input stimuli at different positions in the AEL, however all of
them disappear and Communicate−Error neuronal popula-
tion wins. The Communicate−Error activation enables the
reproduction of the error audio messages. The audio message
that is displayed depends directly on the error that is detected
by the AML, i.e., depends on the winning activation within
the AML due to its internal competition.
B. Dynamic Action Coordination
The two agents have physical limitations that need to be
mutually compensated. For instance, the robot cannot remove
the stopper/cup and the human can but only when helped by
the robot, i.e., to remove the stopper the robot has to hold the
bottle while the human removes it. Figure 3, snapshots S4
to S6 in panel A, show one example of the process of action
coordination between the two agents that allow coping with
their physical limitations. The human reaches and grasps
the closed bottle (CB) from above (panel A, snapshots S4
and S5). As previously, the motor action is decomposed in
its elementary motor primitives, i.e. Reach, Grasp with
Above Grip (AG) object close bottle. This sequence
of motor primitives is associated with the goal directed action
of handing over the CB in the ASL, which in turn is also
closely related with the intention of removing the stopper in
IL. Contrary to the previous situation (snapshots S1−S3), the
action of grasping the bottle from above enables the robot
to safely grasp and hold it out so the human can remove the
stopper. Given this, the robot decides to hold the bottle for
the human and gives him instructions that he may remove
the stopper (panel A, snapshot S6).
Attending to the human desires does not come from a
purely reactive behavior but rather comes from some level
of reasoning about the interaction scenario. Snapshots S7
to S9 of figure 3 provide a good example and reveal once
again the importance of the contextual data on the final
decision (in this particular case the effect of the OML in
the AEL). The human holds out his empty hand towards the
robot which infers that the human is requesting the (inverted)
glass (IG) in its workspace. In this situation two main goal
directed actions actions compete in AEL for expression in
overt behavior, namely, Reach−and− turn−glass (A6) and
Reach−Turn−and−hand−over−glass (A7). The selection
of the A6 instead of A7 comes from the fact that within
the OML it is encoded an open bottle (OB) in the robot’s
workspace (RWS). Based on this information, the action of
handing over the glass is inhibited and the evolution of the
activity in AEL is biased to select the action of reaching the
inverted glass (IG) and place it once more in the RWS. This
situation evidences that in each action selection process there
is always a basic reasoning mechanism. In this example,
since the robot has the bottle in its workspace, and it is
opened, it is more efficient to hand over the glass but only
when filled by the robot itself.
C. Fluency in the Interaction
Like human, robots must able to perceive and predict the
intentions underlying ongoing actions, shaping its behavior.
The capability to predict the human intention is important for
fluent and efficient interaction, and is a fundamental feature
to turn the robot into an effective socially aware assistant
robot.
Figure 4 presents two different situations in which the flex-
ibility of the decision process is crucial to ensure consistency
and fluidity in the interaction. At snapshot S10 (in panel A)
the robot has the Open Bottle (OB) and the Empty Glass
(EG) in its workspace, this means that there are already two
sub-goals that have been fulfilled (i.e. Open− Bottle and
Fig. 4. The impact of CSGL in anticipatory action selection. Panel A:
continuation of the snapshots of video in Fig. 3. Panel B: Field activity
in CSGL Past, Present and Future layers, respectively. Panel C:Temporal
evolution of the input to AEL (top) and activity in AEL (bottom).
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Turn−Glass) and other two sub-goals (i.e. Fill−glass and
Hand−over− f ull−glass) that need to be accomplished.
In panel B (figure 4) one can observe which sub-goals
have been met initially, they are represented at the GSGL−
Past (Open− bottle and Turn− glass sub-goals), and the
sub-goals that should be under the attention of the robot
arise at the GSGL−Present and GSGL−Future (i.e. Fill−
glass and Hand− over− f ull− glass, respectively). Since
it is necessary to satisfy first the Fill−glass sub-goal over
the Hand−over− f ull−glass sub-goal, an activation peak
emerges in the GSGL−Present coding that priority. Due to
its current low priority, the Hand−over− f ull−glass sub-
goal appears at the GSGL−Future, figure 4 panel B (T3−
T4). The activation patterns in CSGL benefit all actions in
AEL that satisfy the goal of filling the glass. The action
selection process is thus biased to produce an output that
drives the robot to Reach− grasp− open− bottle− f ill−
glass (figure 4, snapshot S11 and S12).
At snapshot S13 the robot faces a similar situation and it
has to decide on its own which path the interaction should
take. From the panel B (T4−T5) of figure 4 one can observe
that now the Fill−glass sub-goal is at the GSGL−Past and
the Hand−over− f ull−glass is now at the GSGL−Present.
As a consequence of that, the robot’s behavior is different
from the previously observed. It now reaches the (full) glass
and hands it over to the human (figure 4 snapshot S14 and
S15 and Reach− f ull−glass− to−hand−over from panel
C (T4−T5)). These two situations show that the robot is
capable of flexibly decide what action must be performed and
that shared task knowledge (CSGL) plays a very important
role in that flexibility.
D. Adaptation to different users
In order to study the capability of the robot to take the
initiative when interacting with a human, some experiments
where carried out where the human had a passive attitude.
The interaction scenario is composed by a closed bottle (CB)
and an empty glass (EG) in the upright position. The open
bottle and the glass are located in the robot’s and user’s
workspace respectively. The sub-goal of turning the glass is,
at the outset of the interaction, accomplished (see figure 5,
panel B (T0−T1) CSGL−Past).
From the CSGL−Present the need of opening the bottle
is extracted and the decision in AEL is biased toward the
robot asking for help to open the bottle. As can be seen
in panel C, time interval T0−T1, in the AEL emerges the
action of Grasp−hold−bottle−to−remove−cup (see also
snapshots S1 to S3 in panel A, figure 5). After that, the
Open−bottle sub-goal disappears from the CSGL−Present
and emerges at the CSGL−Past and the Fill−glass previ-
ously at the GSGL−Future rises at the CSGL−Present,
setting the next interaction priority (panel B (T1− T2)
CSGL−Present and CSGL−Future). Now, the robot has
the open bottle (OB) in its workspace while the empty glass
(EG) remains at the human’s workspace. In this situation the
robot has two possible actions competing for expression in
overt behavior, ’handover the bottle’ to the human or ’request
Fig. 5. An example that illustrates the capability of the robot to take the
initiative when interacting with a passive person. Panel A: Video snapshots.
Panel B: Field activity in CSGL Past, Present and Furure layers, respectively.
Panel C: Temporal evolution of the input to AEL (top) and activity in AEL
(bottom).
the glass’ (panel C, (T1− T2)). It decides to request the
glass and holds out its hand towards the human (panel A,
snapshots S4 to S6). As can be observed, with this action
the goal of filling the glass has not yet been satisfied, and
this task sub-goal remains active from the current interaction
to the next one (panel B,(T2− T3) CSGL− Present). At
the time between T2 and T3 the robot fills the empty
glass (panel A, snapshots S7 to S9), the Fill− glass sub-
goal disappears from the CSGL−Present and rises at the
CSGL−Past and then the Hand−over− f ull−glass is set as
the present sub-goals (panel B (T3−T4) CSGL−Present),
which in turn triggers in the AEL the goal directed action of
reach−grasp− f ull−glass− to−handover.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In order to interact with humans in a social context and
particularly in assistive tasks to people with disabilities, the
robot must be capable of extracting meaning from what it
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observes. In the assistive task here used to test the robot
capabilities, the robot has to extract information from the
interaction scenario (i.e. obtain the objects positions and
states) and also from its partner by tracking his goal directed
actions, the context in which they occur, and infer the
underlying motor intentions. Only based on these can the
robot select an adequate complementary actions that better
facilitates the interaction and serves the human user.
The capability of human and non-human primates to
understand actions performed by other individuals is thought
to be closely linked with their motor repertoire. It is thought
that primates extract meaning from actions based on their one
motor experience, i.e., from the actions that are somehow
coded in their cortical structures. The MNS seems to be
particularly important in this issue because it is thought
to be the fundamental mechanism for goal-directed actions
representation within the cortex, and thus for interaction
itself. The cognitive architecture for human-robot interaction
here presented tries to implement some of the elementary
features of the MNS in an attempt to endow the robot
with rudiments of action understanding and goal inferencing.
When the human performs a goal-directed motor act, that
action can be characterized by the way that the human
interacts with the environment (objects) and by its target
(objects or the robot itself). It is this information that enables
the robot to first represent actions in specialized pools of
neurons at the OL and after that ’simulate’ them (through
activation of the corresponding goal directed motor-chains)
at the ASL level.
The robot is capable of acquiring the object positions
and states, and the motor primitives used by the human to
interact with the environment, through the vision system.
This information produces activation patterns on specialized
pools of neurons in the OL, in the OML and in the CSGL.
The motor primitives in the OL normally have several actions
attached to them, so in order to simulate correctly what
action was really performed, it is necessary to combine that
data with contextual information and task knowledge, which
are coded in OML and CSGL, respectively. By having a
representation of the action and its grounding context in its
cognitive structure, the robot is also capable of extracting
the underlying intentions of actions (at the IL). The ability
to simulate actions, infer action underlying intentions and
accommodate the environmental information in the decision
making process enables the robot to understand the human
and, more importantly, predict the outcomes of those ac-
tions. Clear evidences of this are the action monitoring and
flexible action allocation abilities demonstrated by the robot.
Additionally, the ability to predict the action consequences
allowed the robot a behavior far more complex than a purely
reactive agent. In some situations the robot did not satisfy
the human’s desires, that did not imply a wrong behavior
by itself, but instead a step forward in the interaction, as
illustrated in figure 3 snapshots S7 to S9.
Moreover, the role of the OML and the CSGL becomes
particularly important when the human for some reason
becomes/is more passive. The information coded in these
layers enabled the robot to engage in interaction with the
human even when he was more passive or totally passive.
This feature is of particular importance if one considers the
possible application of robots as socially assistive agents, in
healthcare facilities or in home environments, providing care
to people with motor or cognitive disabilities.
Another important feature is the fact that the robot acquires
all the necessary information from the human without using
any verbal communication. The verbal communication in
scenarios where a fast interaction is needed may be a dis-
advantage or even inconceivable, for instance when dealing
with people with serious cognitive disabilities. The use the
non-verbal communication provides a common ground of
understanding between teammates and enables the robot to
interact with people from different cultural background and
geographies without changing anything. The verbal commu-
nication exists only from the robot to the human in order to
provide an outward feedback of its internal state and to help
the human to understand what the robot is doing. The robot’s
verbal expression can be seen as an embodied dialog, i.e., it
comes only from what the robot observes and does. Within
the cognitive architecture every pool of neurons of the ASL,
the IL, the AML and the AEL has a single verbal expression
associated a priori to it. The dialogue is constructed based
on what the robot simulates in the ASL, what if infers in
the IL and AML and on what it decides in the AEL, without
any external interference.
At first sight it may look like that the capabilities of the
robot presented could have been implemented by an intricate
state machine. One very important difference is the aspect
of time, i.e. the timing at which the decisions and actions of
the human evolve play a role in the robot’s interpretation and
decision processes. In the dynamic neural field architecture
the decision process linked to complementary actions unfolds
over time under multiple influences which are themselves
modelled as dynamic representations with proper time scales.
This is the basis of flexible behaviour in dynamic joint action
conditions. As was shown in the results section, the absence
or delay of information about for instance the co-actor’s
motor intention will automatically lead to a decision that
does not take into account the co-actor.
An obvious extension of the present work is to test the
robot in more complex assistive tasks, and to endow the
assistant robot with learning capabilities that will allow it to
learn from, and adapt to users that for example use different
means (i.e. different motor acts) when performing the same
task, and thus become a more adequate social partner. In
previous work we have made the first steps to show that
by using correlation based learning rules with a gating that
signals the success of behavior it is possible to evolve mirror-
like representations that support an action understanding
capacity [11], [10].
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